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Abstract
We develop a method in which vignettes–a battery of questions for
hypothetical cases–are evaluated with item response theory to create a
metric for doctor quality. The method allows a simultaneous estimation of
quality and validation of the test instrument that can be used for further
reﬁnements. The method is applied to a sample of medical practitioners in
Delhi, India. The method gives plausible results, rationalizes diﬀerent per-
ceptions of quality in the public and private sectors and pinpoints several
serious problems with health care delivery in urban India. The ﬁndings
conﬁrm for instance, that the quality of private providers located in poorer
areas of the city is signiﬁcantly lower than those in richer neighborhoods.
Surprisingly, similar results hold for providers in the public sector with
important implications for inequities in the availability of health care.
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1. Introduction
The "quality" of medical care is an important determinant, of both the demand for health services and
health outcomes. How to measure quality, though, is more problematic. Quality has been alternatively
deﬁned by physical infrastructure, the stock of medical supplies, the total number of assigned personnel, the
availability of refrigeration units, the availability of electricity or a combination of some of these (Collier and
others 2003; Lavy and Germain 1994). A remarkable but understandable omission from these indicators is
the quality of medical personnel themselves, particularly since they account for the largest component of
cost and arguably make the greatest contribution to health outcomes in these facilities.
The omission is remarkable since, as an explanation of demand, it is the nature of the advice given that
is actually speciﬁc to the facility. The presence or absence of drugs, for example, indicates the degree of
subsidy that a service represents (if drugs are distributed free of charge in public facilities). This measure
is not informative about the inherent quality of advice or likely outcome of visiting the facility as opposed
to self-medicating. Further, public facilities with high demand due to high quality are more likely to face
"stock outs" if drugs are free,. resulting in potential misclassiﬁcations. From the point of view of household
optimization, the response to improvements in facility characteristics that can be purchased in a market
(medicines are a prime example) will be less than improvements in non-tradable characteristics such as
provider quality (on this see Foster 1995; for an application to schooling, Das and others 2003).
These problems are especially exacerbated in environments such as urban India, the focus of this study,
where (a) the private sector is the primary provider of care and there is little variation in out-patient
infrastructure, (b) health insurance is virtually non-existent so that most spending is out-of-pocket and (c)
the de jure regulation and certiﬁcation of providers does not translate into de facto enforcement so that
households are faced with a bewildering variety of providers characterized by very diﬀerent competence
levels (Mahal and others 2001, Kakar 1988, Rohde and Viswanathan 1995 and Jessani 1997).
Moreover, recurrent expenditure on medical supplies and infrastructure is small compared to that on
personnel. India spent over 60 percent of its recurrent health budget (which accounts for 97 percent of
all expenditure) on salaries in 1990 (Reddy and Selvaraju 1994). Given the predominance of salaries in
the health budget, a critical policy question is whether expenditures are eﬃciently allocated. Are public
facilities providing a service that cannot be obtained in the (usually very large) private market?
The omission is also understandable. Apart from logistic problems and the high human capital re-
quirements of measuring provider quality, there is little consensus on how it should be measured. This is
particularly true of low-income countries characterized by multiple medical systems and degrees. While some
progress has been made (Peabody 2000 and Leonard 2003) there are a number of problems that remain un-
resolved. One fundamental issue is the construction of a metric that can be used to gauge the validity of the
measurement tool–how does measured quality compare to the "true" quality of the provider? The problem
is particularly severe when providers respond optimally to incentives so that practice is a poor reﬂection of
knowledge. In this case, using observed practice to validate measures of knowledge (as in Peabody, 2000) is
invalid.Wklfk Drfwru?: Crpelqlqj Vljqhwwhv dqg Iwhp-Rhvsrqvh wr Mhdvxuh Drfwru Qxdolw| 2
This paper addresses the problem of measuring the "knowledge" or "competence" dimension of provider
quality through the use of clinical vignettes in combination with Item Response Theory (IRT) methods (Ham-
bleton, Swaminathan and Rogers 1991). The combination of vignettes along with item response provides two
beneﬁts. First, clinical vignettes, by standardizing the cases used to judge quality, allow us to abstract from
the provider’s case-load mix that may reﬂect unobserved selection criteria. Second, item response theory uses
the test data to generate a measure of the "usefulness" of the test (in a sense made more precise below) for
measuring competence, eliminating the need for a separate, independent metric of comparison. Statistically
this technique is related to principal components or factor analysis in that it extracts a measure of a latent
variable–a student’s general grasp of knowledge in school examinations, knowledge of medical procedures
in our analysis–from a set of response vectors.
These techniques are used with data collected from 205 public and private providers in 7 localities of
Delhi by the authors over a two-year period. The choice of these particular providers and neighborhoods
is discussed below; in essence the sample is tied to a pre-existing household survey and represents the
available universe of providers for households in the parallel study. The providers cover a very broad range
of skills and qualiﬁcations and the particularities of an urban environment allow us to investigate a number
of questions regarding the relationship between competence, market organization and provider choice in a
broader research project.
This paper focuses on the measurement problem that is a necessary ﬁrst stage for examining the question
of provider choice and organization of the market for health care. The results are encouraging. The study
ﬁnds that despite tremendous variation, the use of vignettes allows for a reasonably precise measurement of
competence. The method performs well in distinguishing between providers with high and low competence
although it is better at distinguishing among relatively competent providers than distinguishing within the
lower end of the competence distribution.
Based on this competence index the paper presents some results on the treatment patterns of providers
and the structure of the health care market in Delhi. Some surprising ﬁndings emerge. With regard to the
treatment patterns, the study shows that a provider classiﬁed as highly competent by the index satisﬁes
only a very weak condition–the ability to distinguish life-threatening situations and act accordingly, either
through treatment at the clinic itself or through referrals. A signiﬁcant proportion are unable to diagnose such
conditions and the competence index eﬀectively captures the provider’s ability to recognize such conditions.
In this sample, 28 percent were unable to diagnose a textbook case of uncomplicated pulmonary tuberculosis
and 44 percent were unable to diagnose and refer a standard case of pre-eclampsia (a complication of
pregnancy that both requires immediate care and is responsible for a substantial fraction of maternal deaths).
What correlates with competence? Households in poor neighborhoods are worse oﬀ in a number of ways.
On the one hand, more competent providers are predominantly in richer areas and on the other, even within
the public sector less competent providers are in poorer localities. Apart from the neighborhood, medical
training accounts for the most signiﬁcant proportion of the variation in competence with the expected sign.
Finally, on the job experience (or tenure in the particular neighborhood) has little impact. If anything, itWklfk Drfwru?: Crpelqlqj Vljqhwwhv dqg Iwhp-Rhvsrqvh wr Mhdvxuh Drfwru Qxdolw| 3
leads to a slight decline, perhaps because any learning-by-doing is more than balanced by improvements in
the training received by recent graduates (vintage eﬀects). The distribution of competence across poor and
rich neighborhoods is the same for young and old providers, consistent with the hypothesis that observed
diﬀerences arise due to sorting rather than diﬀerential depreciation in competence.
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 highlights some problems in the literature
concerning the measurement of competence. Section 3 outlines the statistical theory on which the analysis
is based as well as the econometric issues that arise in the use of the competence variable. Section 4 then
presents the vignettes methodology and the sampling strategy. Section 5 presents results and Section 6
concludes with suggestions for improvements in the instrument for future studies of this kind.
2. Measures of Quality
The measurement of quality of care has never been an easy task. Such measures are proposed for
very diﬀerent purposes and have, inter alia, measured knowledge of medical practitioners, their behavior in
clinical settings and the outcomes of medical treatments. Confusing the three, which are all determined by
and should be measured by diﬀerent means, has been a serious problem. While the ultimate outcome of
interest is the actual health improvement of a patient, it is important to distinguish inherent characteristics of
the provider (knowledge or competence) from the behavior of the provider in diﬀerent settings and incentive
environments or the outcomes they actually achieve. Further, complications arise for a variety of reasons
such as the diﬃculty of correcting for diﬀerences in case-loads, strategic behavior on the part of the provider
and selection bias on the part of the patient.
Correcting for case-loads is a particularly diﬃcult problem for all methods of measurement based on
outcomes. Better doctors see more diﬃcult cases either by referral or by reputation. One way of addressing
this problem has been to avoid provider characteristics as indicators of quality entirely, and to focus instead
on physical quality indicators such as medication and infrastructure. A second approach is to use either
standardized-patients or vignettes, both of which present all providers with the same case-load mix thus
abstracting from the joint distribution of provider competence and patient characteristics.
Under the standardized patient (SP) framework, every provider is visited by an identical (and anonymous)
"patient" and evaluated on the basis of performance vis-a-vis this patient. In contrast, vignettes present
providers with a ﬁxed number of cases, acted out (with the knowledge of the physician) by the surveyor.
For each case, the provider behaves "as-if" the surveyor is the presenting patient and conducts the case
accordingly. As with the SP, providers are then assessed on the basis of their performance in each case. Two
diﬀerent approaches have been followed in comparing SPs and vignettes as measures of competence
One approach has been to treat the SP framework as the gold standard against which to measure
performance in the vignettes. This for instance is the approach taken by Peabody and others (2000) in
their comparison of vignettes, standardized patients a n dc h a r ta b s t r a c t i o n .B a s e do nt h ec o m p a r i s o n ,t h e y
conclude that vignettes are an inexpensive and accurate measurement tool for measuring provider quality.1
1Though, given that the methods were compared only on the basis of their average scores and not on the correlation between
scores on diﬀerent methods, it is unclear what conclusions can be drawn from the study.Wklfk Drfwru?: Crpelqlqj Vljqhwwhv dqg Iwhp-Rhvsrqvh wr Mhdvxuh Drfwru Qxdolw| 4
A contrasting view is that what providers do may be very diﬀerent from what they know they should
do. For instance, Rethans and others (1991) in a survey of 36 physicians in Netherlands show that SPs
and vignettes generate very diﬀerent responses. The authors ﬁnd that treatment in practice is worse than
treatment in vignettes and that the correlation between competence in vignettes and in the clinical settings
was an insigniﬁcant -0.04. More recently, Leonard (2003) shows that the results from vignettes are not
comparable to those from direct clinical observation (of actual patients, not SPs). More startlingly, for some
questions a correct answer in the vignettes yields no further information regarding provider behavior in the
clinical setting. Leonard (2003) concludes that vignettes are a useful quality evaluation tool but are not a
complete replacement for direct observation.
An incentive based view of the comparison between SPs, vignettes and direct clinical observation is
that the performance of a provider is the outcome of an optimizing process. In particular, performance in
the clinical setting depends on provider competence, the eﬀort expended and the provider’s expectations
regarding the patient’s future behavior, each of which would reﬂect conditions of the market. For example,
consider the problem of follow-up–will the patient return when asked? If the provider thinks it unlikely that
the patient will return (based on her best estimate) she will adjust her behavior accordingly by perhaps not
suggesting diagnostic tests or by providing medicines that can act under a number of diﬀerent contingencies.2
The outcome of this joint maximization can be diﬀerent for vignettes, SPs, and clinical observation, albeit
in unknown directions. For instance, vignettes could diﬀer from SPs in that, for the latter, the characteristics
of the patient are exactly the characteristics of the person that the provider sees–the SP cannot pretend to
be a diﬀerent person. Consequently, conditioning on observables, the provider will choose as her best guess
of the patient’s future behavior the conditional mean of her own patient population and this could aﬀect
her performance in the case.3 To the extent that a vignette controls not only the case-load mix but also
the patient-mix, it thus aﬀords greater standardization of confounding factors and more reliable estimates
of provider competence, but not of case-load controlled clinical behavior.
The ﬁndings of both Rethans and others (1991) and Leonard (2003) suggest that an important issue then
is the construction of a metric with which to gauge the validity of the vignettes instrument. In particular,
if optimizing behavior on the part of the provider invalidates the use of the SP as a gold standard for
the vignettes, how to measure the informational content of measures based on vignettes becomes a critical
question. The following discussion shows how the use of item response addresses this issue.
3. Item Response Overview4
Item Response Theory (IRT) was ﬁr s t( a n dc o n t i n u e st ob e )u s e di nt h eﬁeld of psychometrics (Rasch
1960) to understand the relationship between some condition of the patient (for instance depression) and
2In US hospitals for example, standard of care for patients with sexually transmitted diseases who may be unlikely to return
is very diﬀerent for those with whom the provider has a regular relationship. For the former, standard of care requires that a
broad spectrum antibiotic be used that can work on a number of diﬀerent strains, but has worse side-eﬀects.
3For instance, a SP presenting to a provider in a locality where all patients comply with diagnostic test recommendations
might receive very diﬀerent advice from one presenting to a provider with the same level of competency operating in a locality
with poor compliance
4This section is drawn from Birnbaum (1967) and further developments by Hambleton and others (1991) and Hattie (1983)
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her response to a set of questions. The theory is based on the assumption that there is an underlying latent
random variable, θ, and every question in a test maps this latent variable to a response. In the context of this
paper, the latent variable θ is interpreted as provider competence. Using maximum likelihood techniques
both θ as well as various characteristics of the test, such as the precision with which this parameter is
identiﬁed by the administered test, can be recovered.
To present the ideas formally consider a test with J dichotomously scored items indexed j =1 ,...,J and
deﬁne xj ∈ {0,1} a st h er e s p o n s et oi t e mj.L e tx be the (J × 1) response vector and deﬁne a scoring rule,
s(x): J →  +as a mapping from the response vector to the non-negative section of the real number line.5
We are interested in determining the form of this scoring rule. Of particular interest are scoring rules that
minimize the error of classiﬁcation in the following sense: consider the decision rule that allocates competence
as ‘high’ if s(x) >x o and low otherwise. An intuitive requirement for a scoring rule is admissibility in the
sense of Bayes. An admissible scoring rule will then allow for decisions that minimize a linear combination
of Type I (classifying as high when actually low) and Type II (classifying as low when actually high) errors.
Once such a scoring rule has been derived, the "minimized" error of classiﬁcation provides a direct measure
of the internal validity of the test. Speciﬁcally, the variance of this error indicates the extent to which the
given test can distinguish between providers of diﬀerent competencies. It is precisely in this sense that the
use of item response obviates the need for a separate metric to evaluate the validity of the vignettes.
Thus, for every item j,d e ﬁne Pj :  →[0,1] s.t. Pr(xj =1 |θ)=Pj(θ). The Item Characteristic Curve,
Pj(θ), maps the latent variable to the probability of answering item j correctly. The following assumptions
are required:
1. Unidimensionality: θ is a real number and not a vector of real numbers.
2. No Diﬀerential Item Functioning: (No DIF): Let yi be an attribute of individual i. Then, Pr(xj =
1|θi,y i)=P r ( xj =1 |θi)
3. Conditional Independence: Pr(xj =1 ,x k =1 |θ)=P r ( xj =1 |θ)Pr(xk =1 |θ) ∀j,k.
In the context of the vignettes, these assumptions are fairly stringent. Unidimensionality requires that
the vignettes measure only one trait–say competence–and not a vector of traits such as competence and
motivation. Similarly, the second assumption requires that responses are generated only as a function of this
latent trait and are unrelated to any other characteristics of the provider. This may be particularly hard to
justify if providers work in very diﬀerent environments. For instance, if the same vignette is administered to
those working in environments with very diﬀerent recourse to medical testing facilities, tests ordered during
the vignette may be a reﬂection of the provider’s circumstances rather than the latent trait.
5A special scoring rule is the ‘number-right’ score under which T =
SJ
j=1 xj. To contrast with classical test theory, using i
to denote an individual,
Ti = τi + εi
where τi is the ‘true’ test score and εi is a sampling error–if an individual could take a test repeated times, then the average of
the test scores would coverge to τi;e q u i v a l e n t l y ,w eh a v eE(Ti)=τi. Note that under classical test theory, we cannot separate
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probability with which 
a person of a specified 
knowledge obtains a 
correct answer 
Figure 1: Parameters of the 3-Parameter Logistic
Conditional independence might also be hard to satisfy. Standard procedures followed in the diagnosis and
treatment of disease form a decision tree, where successive questioning leads to the elimination of possibilities.
Therefore, the response to questions further down particular branches will depend on the answers received
previously. Although the construction of the vignettes took into account the assumptions of item response in
attempt to minimize this problem, there are cases where these assumptions are probably violated and these
are discussed later.
To complete the model, further structure is required on the functions Pj(θ), one for each question j.
Following Birnbaum (1967), Pj(θ) is given by the 3-parameter logistic so that
Pj(θ)=cj +( 1− cj)
1
1+e x p {−aj(θ − bj)}
(1)
The parameters aj , bj and cj each have intuitive interpretations (Figure 1).
The "guessing parameter" cj represents the lower bound of the characteristic curve–this is the probability
that an individual with θ →− ∞(or no competence at all) will answer item j correctly. In the context of the
vignettes, this could correspond to the provider asking certain obvious questions such as "Does the patient
have a fever?". The "diﬃculty parameter" bj is a location parameter and is the value of θ s.t. Pj(θ)=
1+cj
2 ,
i.e., the point on the latent variable scale where the probability of correctly answering the question is halfway
between the ﬂoor given by the guessing parameter and the maximum. The greater the diﬃculty of the item,
the lower the probability that someone with a particular value of θ will answer the question correctly. Finally,
the "discrimination parameter" aj is proportional to the slope of Pj(θ) at the point where θ = bj and thus
measures the ability of the item to distinguish between values of the latent variable that are close to each
other in the neighborhood of its diﬃculty. Due to the characteristics of the logistic function, the slope of
Pj(θ) reaches its maximum at the level of bj though this would not necessarily be true for other functionalWklfk Drfwru?: Crpelqlqj Vljqhwwhv dqg Iwhp-Rhvsrqvh wr Mhdvxuh Drfwru Qxdolw| 7






Pj(θi,a j,b j,c j)xij{1 − Pj(θi,a j,b j,c j)}1−xij (2)
Maximization of the likelihood function then provides the required normal equations. One method of solving
this likelihood is to use an iterative process by assuming a distribution over θ, solving for the item parameters
and then using the item parameters as given for the next iteration. The Joint Maximum Likelihood estima-
tors from this process face problems of convergence and the statistical properties are not well understood
(Hambleton and Swaminathan, 1985). The preferred method, Marginal Maximum Likelihood estimation is
based on Bock and Lieberman (1970). With a density of the latent variable f(θ), the marginal probability






Pj(θi,a j,b j,c j)xi{1 − Pj(θi,a j,b j,c j)}1−xif(θ) (3)
If there are two questions in the vignettes the possible response vectors are {{0,0},{0,1},{1,0},{1,1}}.
The expression given by equation (3) is the probability of a particular response vector and with two questions
four such probabilities are computed–in general with J questions, the number of possible response vectors
will be 2J when responses are dichotomous. Denoting ρx(a,b,c) ≡ Pr(x|a,b,c) the marginal likelihood





where rx is the frequency of response vector x in the data. Since the latent variable, θ, has been removed
from the estimation, the estimated item parameters are consistent.6 Once the item parameters have been
estimated, the analog of equation(2) for an individual i and conditioning on the item parameters provides
the required estimates of θ. Solutions are determined to an aﬃne transformation so θ is assumed to be
distributed with mean zero and variance one.7 To relate to the previous discussion of admissible decision
rules and the error of classiﬁcation, the weights implied by the maximum likelihood procedure are optimal
(locally best weights) and lead to admissible decision rules.












6The solution of the integral uses the Expected Maximization algorithm developed by Bock and Aitking (1981) for this
particular case. The assumption of a density for f(θ), in general the normal, is not restrictive (Hambleton and Swaminathan,
1985).
7Solving for the parameters (3J item parameters and N doctors) together leaves one degree of freedom (replacing θ  = mθ+k,
b  = mb + k and a  = a/m will leave the probability of a correct response unchanged so that Pj(θ)=Pj(θ )Wklfk Drfwru?: Crpelqlqj Vljqhwwhv dqg Iwhp-Rhvsrqvh wr Mhdvxuh Drfwru Qxdolw| 8
The standard error of the estimate e θ is then 1 √S
j Ij(θ) and is asymptotically normally distributed.8 Since
this standard error in general is in itself a function of θ, the test will display varying levels of precision at
diﬀerent points of the sample range.
Finally, an important transformation of the latent variable is the proportion true score, deﬁned as the
proportion of questions that an examinee with the latent value θi is expected to answer correctly (where the
expectation is taken over repeated administrations of the same test). Using our notation, the true score,
τ = E(
S






The proportion true score is easily interpretable as the number of questions that would have been answered
correctly if the test were taken repeatedly and this transformation is used to benchmark provider competence
in Section 6.2 below.
4. Vignettes Construction
The vignettes present a case and a standard-patient to the provider, who is then invited to proceed
exactly as she would under normal circumstances. Following the case presentation, the provider is allowed
to ask questions and answers are given according to the case history. Finally, the competence index is based
on the speciﬁc questions asked regarding the history of the case, the examination of the patient, the tests
prescribed and the treatment given. Given the speciﬁcities of the Indian environment, there were three
important considerations.
First, the standardization of the patient was as important as the standardization of the medical problem.
Hence, prior to the presentation of the case the team clearly stated the attributes of the patient. It was
decided that two attributes, related to compliance and follow-up, were suﬃcient for the presentation of a
standardized patient. In every case it was clearly speciﬁed that
1. The patient will comply with the provider’s instructions, medications and tests.
2. The patient will follow-up by returning to the provider if necessary.
To check whether providers were unfamiliar with these patient characteristics, the last page of the mod-
ule speciﬁcally asked about the proportion of patients that actually satisﬁed these two requirements. All
providers felt that at least 10 percent of their patients satisﬁed these attributes while for the median provider
8As an aside, note that the regression analogue to the IRT framework is the conditional logistic model (McFadden, 1973)
where the θ are treated as ﬁxed eﬀects to be estimated along with the item parameters. To see this, note that in the two
parameter model we have that
Pj(θ)
1 − Pj(θ)




= αjθ − βj
which is a linear model in the relative probabilities with θ as (modiﬁed) ﬁxed eﬀects.Wklfk Drfwru?: Crpelqlqj Vljqhwwhv dqg Iwhp-Rhvsrqvh wr Mhdvxuh Drfwru Qxdolw| 9
this increased to 65 percent, suggesting that in most cases providers had some familiarity with these at-
tributes.
The second issue was the presentation of a consistent case, a problem that arose due to the use of
diﬀerent causal models by providers in the diagnosis and treatment of illnesses. Thus, models of causation
could include elements of Ayurveda, Homeopathy, Unani medicine and allopathic practice. Diﬀerences in
case presentation along any of these dimensions would lead to confounding diﬀerences in treatment (for
instance an Ayurveda may prescribe diﬀerent medications depending on the food eaten by the mother for
diarrhea in a child).9 To address this issue, during the pilot phase vignettes were administered to providers
(not in the sample) from varying medical practices and all questions asked were recorded. Standardized
answers were then formulated for these questions and the process was repeated till at least 90 percent of all
questions asked regarding the vignettes cases had been incorporated into the design. This process ensured
standardization of the entire case, even for practitioners of alternative medical systems although they were
not (necessarily) graded on this material. As it turned out, questions speciﬁc to Ayurvedic or Unani medicine
were almost never asked.
Finally, the cases presented in the vignettes were chosen to adequately represent the wide variety of
competence among the providers in the sample. Speciﬁcally, following the declaration of Alma Ata (1978)
the Indian government introduced a number of medical qualiﬁcations, some requiring less than 6 months
of training (Registered Medical Practitioners) and others more than 5 years (Bachelor of Medicine and
Bachelor of Surgery). This system was ostensibly supposed to result in an eﬃcient system of referral and
triage with the less trained providers recognizing and treating certain simple illnesses (diarrhea, viral fevers)
and referring others to more specialized providers. Consequently, the vignettes include cases that should be
treated at lower levels of the referral system as well as those that should be referred to and treated at higher
levels.
The ﬁnal module has 5 cases. Each case is divided into three sections: History, Examination and
Treatment. For the History and the Treatment parts, there is a patient proﬁle (known to the interviewers)
that is used to answer questions that the provider asks. Providers are not prompted with any questions in
these two sections, and information is given only for questions that are speciﬁcally asked by the provider.
The treatment section is divided in two: the ﬁrst part records the treatment given while the second consists
of prompted questions asked to elicit treatment options for diﬀerent types of patients (primarily related to
whether the doctor would change her treatment or test recommendations if the patient were poor). The
interview starts with the presentation of the case, proceeds through the history, examination and treatment
and ﬁnally the prompted treatment questions are asked.
The ﬁve cases were chosen to resemble the most typical presentations of the overall disease proﬁle in the
localities surveyed.
9Note thought that this study cannot evaluate treatment involving medications that are not allopathic (such as homeopathy
or Ayurveda). Interestingly the treatment of the illness remained primarily allopathic–less than 5 percent of all medicines
prescribed (both in the vignettes and in clinical observation conducted later) were non-allopathic drugs and in most cases these
were accompanied by allopathic medicines that could be evaluated.Wklfk Drfwru?: Crpelqlqj Vljqhwwhv dqg Iwhp-Rhvsrqvh wr Mhdvxuh Drfwru Qxdolw| 10
1. Case I: A mother who brings in a 8 month old child suﬀering from diarrhea. The child is not severely
dehydrated, the diarrhea does not arise from an infection and oral re-hydration therapy is the only
recommended action.
2. Case II: A man with a one day history of cold and cough, with no fever. The correct diagnosis is viral
pharyngitis and the "right" thing to do is to abstain from medicating, except for symptomatic relief.
3. Case III: A man with a one month history of weight loss, low grade fever and coughing. If the provider
asks, the man has blood in his sputum. The diagnosis is tuberculosis and the correct treatment is either
multi-drug therapy or referral.
4. Case IV: A 17 year old girl, bought in by her mother, who complains of weakness, lethargy and sudden
bouts of crying. The mother says that the child suﬀers from "Low Blood Pressure". The symptoms in
this case were chosen as frequent somatic representations of depression as has been determined from
the household survey.
5. Case V: A woman complains of a severe headache. The practitioner is told that he/she notices that the
woman is pregnant (in the seventh month if asked). The underlying problem is a case of pre-eclampsia,
an acute life-threatening condition requiring immediate referral to a hospital.
These cases were chosen so that a diﬀerent set of "ideal" responses could be elicited regardless of the
position of the provider in the medical care system. Thus, Case I and Case II should be treated in a primary
care context and not referred to higher treatment levels. Case III should be treated under the government’s
ongoing Directly Observable Therapy (DOTS) program, but may be treated in a primary care context as
well given the perfect follow-up of our standard-patient. Case IV can either be treated or referred, while
Case V should be immediately referred to a hospital.10 Reﬂecting their position in the triaging system, 80
percent of providers felt that they saw Case I and II almost every day; this decreased to 25 percent for Case
III and further to 15 and 8 percent for Cases IV and V, respectively (Table 1).
In the context of the IRT framework it was important that the questions used for grading were such
that the answer to any one question would not aﬀect whether some other graded question would be asked.
Consider for instance the ﬁrst case of a child with diarrhea. In this particular case, the provider is recorded
as having given a correct response for each of the following questions asked:
1. Does the child have a fever?
2. When did the child last urinate?
3. Is there vomiting?
4. What is the frequency of stools?
10In three cases (except Case III and possibly Case IV) no medication is required except those given for symptomatic relief.
This is a drawback of the current vignettes design–there is no case that requires a speciﬁc medication to be given in the
primary care setting (such as Albendazole for a worm infestation). In future studies we plan to include a sixth such case.Wklfk Drfwru?: Crpelqlqj Vljqhwwhv dqg Iwhp-Rhvsrqvh wr Mhdvxuh Drfwru Qxdolw| 11
5. Is there blood and mucous in the stools?
Each of these questions must be asked for a complete history irrespective of the answers to the others both
to determine the level of hydration of the child as well as the possibility of a bacterial infection. While clearly
these conditions could not be met in all cases (the movement from history and examination to treatment is
particularly likely to violate this assumption) the choice of questions was based largely with this conditional
independence assumption in mind.
5. Sample
The sample is drawn from seven localities in Delhi where a concurrent household survey over two years
was conducted by the same team. The attributes of the households in these localities is detailed in Das and
Sánchez (2002). The authors ﬁnd that the sample is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from Delhi samples of either
the National Family Health Survey or the National Sample Survey for most variables, though households in
the study are slightly better oﬀ in terms of consumption aggregates. There was only a 4% refusal rate to
participate in the survey thus making it unlikely that selection into the study biases the sample in terms of
health status.
The sample frame for the current study was constructed in two steps. First, a universe of providers was
constructed and a short questionnaire with basic questions on training, education and tenure was adminis-
tered. This universe consisted of two diﬀerent sets of providers–those who had been visited by households in
the survey and those who practiced within a 15 minute walking radius of any household in the sample.11 The
study sample was chosen by drawing 20 to 25 providers from each locality from the set of providers visited
and an additional 10 from those who were in the universe, but had never been visited. The ﬁrst set was
drawn via a probability-proportional-to-visits (size) sampling scheme and the second was drawn randomly
with equal weights (the scheme for the ﬁrst set explains the variation across localities–some neighborhoods
had fewer total providers visited during the survey period). Thus, the sampling scheme addressed two pur-
poses by simultaneously ensuring that information would be gathered on providers visited by the household
as well as ensuring that the overall proﬁle closely resembles the choice set of the average household in the
city.
Over a period of 12 months vignettes were completed for 85 percent of the original sample. There were
two reasons for non-participation, both of which could be correlated to the competence of the provider.
The ﬁrst was turnover whereby the original provider had left the locality or the clinic had shut down since
the time of the household survey, a period of between 6 and 12 months. This accounted for 2.5 percent
of the original sample. The second was refusal to participate, accounting for 10 percent of providers in
the original sample.12 The direction of bias is hard to determine since refusal to participate could indicate
11Not all providers who were visited by the households could be contacted. Failure to contact arose due to lack of suﬃcient
information (visited "the doctor in X locality") or the inability of the team (and the household who had visited the provider)
to locate the clinic.
12The remaining 2.5 percent were all providers who had been visited by households in the past, but could not be located.
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low competence if such providers were worried about the results of the study or high competence if the
opportunity cost of time exceeded the incentive to participate.13 Moreover, disaggregation by the locality
of the practice (more competent providers are in richer areas–see below) is not informative since rejections
were equally distributed across neighborhoods.
The providers chosen have varying qualiﬁcations, institutional aﬃliations and tenure in the neighborhood.
For this paper, qualiﬁcations are aggregated into two groups–those who hold Bachelor of Medicine and
Bachelor of Surgery (MBBS) degrees and those who do not. The former are the equivalent of MDs in the US;
the latter can be practitioners with formal training in alternative medicine, those with no formal training but
with degrees recognized by the government, and those with no formal degrees or government recognition.14
Finally, providers in the public sector are divided in two–those who work in public dispensaries and primary
health care centers and those who work in hospitals. Since hospitals in Delhi historically reﬂected the standard
of care in the country, we would expect these two groups to diﬀer substantially.
This sample interviewed, which reﬂects both actual and available household choice, is slightly diﬀerent
from the universe of providers. In particular, it tends to over-represent MBBS doctors and providers in the
public sector. While 45 percent of the universe are MBBS degree holders, this increases to 55 percent in
the sample; similarly, public doctors represent 10 percent of providers in the universe, but 20 percent in the
sample. This diﬀerence could arise due to patterns of household choice (if more competent doctors see more
patients) or more rejections by providers with low competence. What this means for our averages is that
the results likely represent an over estimate of true competence in the population.
6. Results
The construction of the competence index uses the history, examination and treatment sections of the
vignettes (Appendix 1, Table A lists every item used). For the treatment questions, a single variable is used
for every case that summarizes the quality of treatment. This variable is based on ratings on a scale of -3
to 3 by three sets of independent doctors, two from South Asia in similar epidemiological environments and
one a team from The Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine. For the present set of results, we treat
this variable as dichotomous by collapsing the negative and the positive scores.15
From a total of 104 questions, 26 were dropped since they were asked by fewer than 5 percent of providers
and the maximum likelihood procedure is not guaranteed to converge with questions that exhibit very low
response rates. While this does not aﬀect our ability to classify providers (since there is no variation in the
data elicited from these questions), the fact that certain kinds of questions were not asked is interesting for
13The lack of systematic enforcement of medical regulations has always been an important issue in Delhi and one that results
in sporadic action when investigated by newspapers and journalists. For this study almost one year was spent obtaining entry
to the ﬁeld through conversations with providers and repeated interactions to build trust.
14Das and Das (2003) discus these numerous degrees and their origins. Note that there are further subdivisions: even among
those with formal training and government recognition, the training period can vary from 1 to 5 years.
15An alternative would be to treat this question as a polytomous response and use the functional form of Samejima’s (1969)
graded response model. Another worry is that the ranking of the provider is sensitive to the rater chosen. With regard to the
second, once the treatment score is treated as dichotomous, the kappa measure of agreement averages 90 percent across the
two South Asian raters and 80 percent across the South Asian and the US raters. Moreover, since the informational content
of treatment questions is very similar to other items in the vignettes, greater subdivisions or the use of diﬀerent raters do not
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its own sake. Less than 5 percent ask about the respiratory rate of the patient for any illness including cases
II and III where the patient complains of coughing as a main symptom. Apart from this, most omissions
arise from a failure to ask what may be considered sensitive questions (sexual behavior, pregnancy for an
unmarried woman) or a failure to probe the history of illnesses in the case of the woman with pre-eclampsia.
The remaining 73 questions and 5 treatment scores are used to construct the competence index (Appendix
1, Table B lists the questions dropped).
6.1. Construction of the Competence Index
Figure 2 presents the distribution of the latent variable θ (competence) and the standard-error of the
estimates following equation (5). Since the competence index is standardized, individual values can be directly
interpreted as standard deviations from the mean. Some interesting characteristics of the vignettes as a
measurement tool immediately emerge. The standard error is not symmetrical–classiﬁcation errors are
larger for the least qualiﬁed providers compared to the better qualiﬁed. The most precise estimates are for
providers one standard deviation to the right of the mean. However, the precision on the low end of the
spectrum is high enough to distinguish between many interesting subpopulations of providers, such as the
type of degree, neighborhood in which they practice and whether they are in the public or private sector.
Figure 3 illustrates in greater detail the relative lack of precision in the region of low competence by
examining the diﬃculty and discrimination ability of each question–the parameters aj , bj and cj in
Equation (1). Although there are a large number of items with diﬃculties in the mid and upper ranges,
there are only 5 items that have diﬃculties low enough to reduce classiﬁcation errors for the lower half
of the latent variable distribution leading to higher standard errors (recall that the diﬃculty represents the
competence at which the probability of a correct response is halfway between the guessing parameter and the
maximum). These include three tests for tuberculosis (blood analysis, sputum and chest X-ray respectively),
taking the blood pressure of a woman with pre-eclampsia and an overall treatment score for dealing with
depression. Further, the only item that has high discrimination is item 65, examination of blood pressure in
the case of pre-eclampsia while the remaining four display fairly ﬂat item characteristic curves.
In terms of provider competence, this has (small) positive and (large) negative repercussions. For ques-
tions about tuberculosis related tests, answers corresponded to a case of simple pulmonary tuberculosis with
no complications. The test for acid-fast bacilli (AFB) is positive. The proﬁle of the patient includes an actual
X-ray of a tuberculosis patient. Any questioning on the right track would lead to an unambiguous diagnosis.
Similarly, asking about blood pressure for the pre-eclampsia case also indicates that the questioning is on
the right track. The fact that all these questions had lower diﬃculties indicates that providers on the left
half of the competence distribution were able to identify (to some extent) the problems that patients were
presenting with.
On the negative side, poor measurements on the lower tail of the distribution arose despite our prior
knowledge of the distribution of competence. For instance, all the vignettes involve straightforward cases
with no complications that are drawn from the most common diseases the providers actually face. That less
than 25 percent of the sample examined the patients for any sign of dehydration in a child with diarrhea orWklfk Drfwru?: Crpelqlqj Vljqhwwhv dqg Iwhp-Rhvsrqvh wr Mhdvxuh Drfwru Qxdolw| 14
that less than half (49 percent) asked the color of the s p u t u mf o ram a nw i t hap e r s i s t e n tm o n t hl o n gc o u g h
and weight loss (when asked, the answer would have been "clear with bright red ﬂecks"–a classic sign of
TB) is disturbing to say the least.
Figures 4 illustrates three things: (a) the contribution of speciﬁc, particularly interesting questions to
the estimation of the competence index; (b) what a "good" question is in terms of discrimination ability
and diﬃculty and (c) the tangible meaning of "competence" as estimated by θ. The ﬁgure plots observed
proportions and model predictions of the probability of asking a question against competence. For both
proportions, 15 groups were formed, over which responses were averaged. The model predictions are thus
our estimate of Pj(θ), the Item Characteristic Curves of item 65, item 39 and item 12.
For examining a woman with pre-eclampsia for high blood pressure, the predictions track observations
well, and that the function is fairly steep (has good discrimination power) in the vicinity of the sample mean
(θ equals zero) implies that it distinguishes well between providers to the left and the right of the mean. The
diﬀerence between a "bad" provider (say, θ < −1 )a n da" g o o d "p r o v i d e r( s a y ,θ > 1 ) could be the diﬀerence
between life and death–almost all competent providers will discover that the woman has dangerously high
blood pressure and more than half of bad providers will not.
Checking to see if a child with diarrhea has a depression in his skull fontanel (indicating severe dehydra-
tion) is a diﬃcult question. The discrimination ability of the question is high, but only at the higher ranges
of competence. Thus, until the provider reaches a certain competence level, the probability of checking
dehydration in this particular manner is very low, though even among our best providers it never exceeds 40
percent. This is revealing of overall competence in our sample, since even though in our vignette the child
does not have this depression, failing to check could miss a serious problem.
The easiest question in the vignettes was to ask for an X-ray for a suspected tuberculosis patient. The
estimate of the "guessing" parameter is extremely high (just under 80 percent). The ﬁgure also illustrates,
however, a limitation of the item response technique–the actual data show that providers with low compe-
tence do much worse than predicted. The failure of the structural model to pick this up is a consequence
of the logistic functional form, which is not ﬂexible enough to capture the actual shape of the data for this
item.16
This naturally raises the question of how reliable our identifying assumptions of unidimensionality, no
diﬀerential item functioning and conditional independence are for the data. Two important tests that have
been proposed in the literature correspond to model ﬁt (how good is the 3 PL structure in our case for the
data) and unidimensionality. The former relies on the analysis of model residuals and a chi-square test to
16One of the advantages of using item response is for designing vignettes in future such studies. Since information (equation(5))
is additive in items, one can choose the items required for a target information function. In the vignettes the choice of items
corresponds to the choice of cases. Disaggregating the information functions case by case shows that most information is
provided by the tuberculosis and pre-eclampsia cases. In fact, the average contribution of these two cases to the entire module
is 80 percent, with higher contributions at lower competence levels. Thus, to distinguish "bad" from "good" providers or
"average" from "good" providers, the use of these two cases is suﬃcient. However, at high competence levels the informational
content drops to below 75 percent, and thus the two cases may not be suﬃcient to distinguish the "very good" from the "good"
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check if the predictions of the model are very diﬀerent from what is actually observed. Thus, we can deﬁne







is then distributed with (m−3) degrees of freedom where m is the number of subgroups (Figure 4 presented
exactly this comparison graphically for three items, where m =1 5 ). The chi-square test does not reject that
the item characteristic curve ﬁts the data for any of our items at the 5 percent level, although the null is
rejected at the 1 percent level for items 69 and 75.17
A second assumption that can be examined is unidimensionality, that is, whether the responses to the
vignettes arise from a single underlying latent variable. A heuristic method to validate the assumption of
unidimensionality is to check the eigenvalues from factor analysis of the items in the test (Drasgow and Lissak,
1983). Figure 5 presents the eigenvalue plot from this analysis. The ﬁrst eigenvalue is almost four times as
large as the second, and apart from the ﬁrst eigenvalue, the rest are indistinguishable. This suggests that
the unidimensionality assumption is valid with ﬁrst component referring to the competence of the provider.
6.2. Benchmarking the Index: How Good is a Competent Provider?
From equation (2) and the discussion of the likelihood procedure, the competence index is standardized
due to an indeterminacy in Equation (1) when competence and item parameters are jointly evaluated. Thus,
the classiﬁcation errors discussed so far refer to the probability of misclassiﬁcation within a pre-determined
scale but are not informative about how this scale corresponds to competence in an "objective" sense. Since
the design of the vignettes was such that a highly competent provider would ask 90 percent or more of the
questions included, one way to understand what competence implies in terms of overall performance is to
benchmark the results using the true score (equation (7)) of providers at diﬀerent levels of the competence
index. A second source of information are the item characteristic curves for the treatment questions, which
can be directly examined to see how competency aﬀects treatment. This provides information, for instance,
on whether a provider with average competence in our sample provides the correct treatment for tuberculosis
50 percent or 90 percent of the time.
Using the true-score, even among the highest quintile of the competence index, performance is poor
(Table 2). While the diﬀerence between the lowest and highest quintiles is almost 2 standard deviations of
the competence index, the percentage of appropriate questions asked increases only from 15 to 48 percent–
the most competent providers in the sample (in expectations) ask only half the relevant questions for the
cases presented. With only 9 history questions asked over 5 cases, it is impossible to have determined, for
example, that a child’s diarrhea was, in fact, relatively harmless or that the woman with pre-eclampsia in
Case 5 needed immediate attention.
17The chi-square test is not conclusive evidence of "good" model-ﬁt. First, the expected proportions are computed using
the identifying assumption of the structural model and second (especially in this case), small sample sizes will lead to a higher
probability of acceptance. A rejection of the chi-square is thus very strong evidence that the correct model wa not used for the
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What does this imply for treatment? Table 3 shows the percentage of doctors who were graded as having
given a treatment that was "not harmful" for the patient in either the short or long run by the raters.
Harmful treatment, in the case of diarrhea for instance, implies using antibiotics and/or anticholinergics; in
tuberculosis failure to either refer or start the patient on multi-drug therapy and in the case of pre-eclampsia
failure to refer the patient to hospital for immediate follow-up.18 While there is some variation, on average in
the highest quintile, only 70 percent treated the patient in a manner that was graded positively by the raters;
among the lowest quintile this drops to 30 percent. On average, competence levels have to be between 0.6 and
1.3 standard deviations above the mean for providers to have a better than even chance of not harming the
patient (the notable exception is the case of tuberculosis where providers who are 1.34 standard deviations
below achieve this level as well). Accounting for the guessing probability, this implies that providers "know"
the correct treatment about 40 percent of the time.
Looked at in another way, the average provider’s treatment is not harmful only between 25 percent and
50 percent of the time for four out of our ﬁve cases (again, for tuberculosis, even less competent providers
are rated positively 50 percent of the time and this increases to above 90 percent for the highest quintile).
Particularly interesting is the case of diarrhea where any treatment that required the use of an oral re-
hydration solution without antibiotics and/or anticholinergics was treated as beneﬁcial by our raters. Given
the widespread advertising and informational campaigns undertaken by the World Health Organization and
other health organizations regarding the treatment of infant diarrhea, it is telling that the majority (note
that even in the top quintile beneﬁcial treatment is given only 60 percent of the time) do not treat this case
of viral diarrhea according to protocol–in most cases by overusing anti—infective drugs and antidiarrheal
drugs Perhaps equally disturbing is the ﬁnding that only 67 percent recommended any ﬂuid intake at all, 46
percent for the lowest quintile and 78 percent for the highest.
6.3. Which Doctor?
Using this index, the paper turns to questions regarding the distribution of competence, and in particular,
inequities in the availability of care. Health care depends critically on the availability of care. For this,
distance matters. Both due to transport and time costs as well as less measurable social factors, the set of
providers that households can visit is circumscribed by residence–most visits in the household survey are
within 15 minutes walking distance, a restriction that is particularly binding for women outside the labor
force. Thus, the care available in the neighborhood is a reasonable ﬁrst approximation of the choice set of
households.
Inter alia, the analysis addresses questions regarding the distribution of competence among public and
private providers. Debates on the relative competence of the public and private sectors in India have raged
for years, particularly since over 85 percent of all visits to health care providers are in the private sector
(for the households in the sample, this increases to 90 percent). Some believe that quality in the private
sector is higher and that is why the private share is so high, particularly among the relatively educated and
aﬄuent. Others note that there are no enforced standards in the private sector and that many providers are
18These guidelines were emerged at by the raters themselves; the implications are deduced from the type of treatment and
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unqualiﬁed "quacks". The decomposition of competence shows that both these views are consistent with the
data.
Figure 6 plots the distribution of competence for three diﬀerent categories of providers–MBBS degree
holders in the public sector, MBBS degree holders in the private sector and non-MBBS providers (all in the
private sector).19 The ﬁrst three graphs show the histogram and the overlaid kernel density for each of the
three categories while the last shows the kernel densities for all three categories together (histograms are
presented since sample sizes are small).
Two characteristics emerge. The ﬁrst is that private providers belong to two very diﬀerent groups–the
distribution of competence among non-MBBS providers is skewed to the right with the mode (equal to the
mean) at -0.7, while that of MBBS providers is skewed to the left with a mode more than one standard
deviation higher at 1.3 (mean 0.65). The distribution of all private providers is distinctly bimodal. Public
providers, while always bounded by private providers, also exhibit a bimodal distribution with modes at
1.1 and -0.5. An institution speciﬁc analysis reveals that one (partial) reason for this bimodal distribution
is the aggregation of providers in bigger central hospitals and those in small clinics and dispensaries–the
mean competence of the former is close to 0.6 while the latter lies 0.4 standard deviations below at 0.2 (we
stress that this is only a partial explanation since some central hospitals have very low means as well). This
breakdown of the competence density is interesting because it simultaneously satisﬁes both notions of the
health care system in India. The notion that the public sector is a "worse" performer than the private sector
is justiﬁed by comparisons of the distribution of public doctors to the distribution of MBBS private doctors.
On the other hand, the opposite is also justiﬁable by comparing the distribution of public doctors to that of
their non-MBBS private counterparts.
What does this imply for poor people? The choice set of the poor is clearly worse than that of the
rich–moving from low to middle-income areas increases average competence by 0.5 standard deviations,
and from low to rich by over 1 standard deviation (Table 4, Column 1). This average diﬀerence is driven by
a number of factors. In line with predictions from a hedonic model of location, providers with less training
are overwhelmingly in poor areas with the proportion of MBBS providers more than doubling moving from
poor to rich (Table 4, Column 2). In addition, within every qualiﬁcation, less competent providers are in poor
areas. Thus, MBBS providers are almost 0.6 standard deviations less competent when in poor compared to
the rich areas and a similar result obtains for those without an MBBS as well (Table 4, Column 3 and 4).
To illustrate the kind of treatment these competence diﬀerentials imply, if a person in a poor neighborhood
randomly picks a provider, the mean competence would be about -0.5. This translates into an increased
probability of harmful treatment by close to 20 percent for a number of illnesses including tuberculosis and
pre-eclampsia.
One option for poor people is to then use government health facilities, where theoretically, providers are
assigned independent of competence. Unfortunately, the data do not support this ideal. Public doctors in
poor areas are substantially worse than those in rich neighborhoods (Table 4, Column 5). While this is
19Recall from our prevous discussion that MBBS degress are the equivalent of MDs in the US and apart from such providers
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particularly true for public providers not based in hospitals where the diﬀerence in competence is almost 0.8
standard deviations moving from poor to rich, it also holds true for hospitals (Table 4, Columns 6 and 7).
In fact, non-MBBS providers in rich areas are more competent than public MBBS providers in poor areas
(p<.05).20
A ﬁnal alternative for the poor is then to use hospitals since they systematically outperform all other
providers in poor and middle income areas. However, both in data from the parallel household survey as
well as the National Sample Survey visits to public hospitals among the poor are minimal. Using data from
the National Sample Survey for instance, Mahal and others (2001) ﬁnd that the proportion of people from
the poorest quintile in urban Haryana (the closest equivalent for Delhi that they present) that go to the
private sector for outpatient treatments was higher than the proportion in the richest quintile (88 percent
versus 84 percent) and the fraction going to public hospitals is a small subset of the total public visits. For
the household survey in the seven localities of this study, similar numbers obtain. Although visits to the
private sector are less frequent (70 percent) and higher among the rich, public hospitals still accounted for
less than 5 percent of out-patient visits.
The regression results largely duplicate the bivariate comparisons. Table 5 shows the results from the OLS
regression. Column 1 uses only the area of residence and the institutional aﬃliation; Column 2 adds on the
qualiﬁcation of the provider and Column 3 adds in the goegraphical origin and tenure in the neighborhood.21
The correlation between poverty and competence remains. From Column 3, the size of the coeﬃcient implies
a decrease of 0.67 standard deviation in competence moving from the richest to the poorest neighborhood
and 0.28 decline for a one standard deviation increase in the percentage of poor households for the sample.
Younger providers in the sample have higher competence controlling for other factors (Column 3), suggesting
a vintage eﬀect whereby learning by doing gains are oﬀset by gains in the technology of training. There are
also no signiﬁcant interaction eﬀects between neighborhood and tenure (not reported), consistent with sorting
of providers into localities. Including the origin of the provider is not particularly informative–providers
from Delhi and Uttar Pradesh (the state neighboring Delhi) are signiﬁcantly more competent and those from
Bihar less so (coeﬃcients not reported). What explains these coeﬃcients is a matter of speculation.
The most important correlate of competence is whether the provider holds an MBBS degree or not.
A provider with an MBBS degree is at least 0.9 standard deviations more competent in all speciﬁcations.
Interestingly, these observable features of the provider still leave at least 35 percent of variation in competence
unexplained–this result is robust to a number of diﬀerent speciﬁcations that include gender and years of
education as well as interactions between locality and other variables.22 What this implies for the ability
20It is possible that the observed diﬀerence in competence between rich and poor areas reﬂects diﬀerential depreciation in
competence across neighborhoods, particularly if providers in poor areas have worse peers and uninformed patients. However,
disaggregating providers by tenure (with similar results if age is used instead) shows that there is a worsening of competence
levels with tenure in all areas, but the diﬀerences between poor and rich neighborhoods remains comparable–among the young
this diﬀerence is 1.09 standard deviations and it increases marginally to 1.15 standard deviations among the old. These patterns
seem more consistent with sorting by providers into localities rather than diﬀerential depreciation over time.
21Note also that all these variables are observable by both households and surveyors (in fact the origin of the provider is
o f t e nu s e da sa ni d e n t i ﬁer–"Bengali" doctors in low income neighborhoods are supposedly low quality providers–we ﬁnd no
evidence for this unfortunate assertion). The explained portion of the regression can then also be used a "lower-bound" for the
forecasting ability of households.
22In addition to the standard R2, the table also shows the R2
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of households to forecast competence is unclear. This could represent an upper bound if variables like the
tenure of the provider are not easily observed; it could also represent a lower bound if communication is an
important means for disseminating information.
7. Caveats and conclusions
This paper developed a method for measuring clinical competence of medical care providers using Item
Response Theory. The method was applied it to data collected by the authors on a sample of providers for
medical services in Delhi and used to compare rich and poor areas as well as the public and private sectors.
The method seems to us (at least) to have promise for future studies of this kind.
The results justify two disparate views on the quality of the public versus the private sector in India.
Among providers in Delhi, competence is higher in the private compared to the public sector if the comparison
is among those with an MBBS degree (this is consistent with the notion that the private sector is better
than the public). Also, competence is lower in the private sector if we restrict private providers to those
without an MBBS degree (the private sector is worse than the public). The distribution of competence
by neighborhood income conﬁrms that health inequities that arise due to household attributes, such as
education, are exacerbated by inequities on the supply side. Private providers in poor neighborhoods are
worse than their counterparts in richer areas. Perhaps surprisingly, the same pattern holds among providers
in the public sector as well.
The item response method presents some advantages over the (standardized) raw score. First, to the
extent that competence is an estimated ﬁxed-eﬀect of the provider, the variance of the estimate provides
a metric with which to gauge the validity of the instrument. This is useful in contexts where provider
behavior may be very diﬀerent from provider knowledge. Second, the additive form of the information
function provides a statistical basis for the choice of cases to be presented. Two cases–tuberculosis and
pre-eclampsia–contribute an average of 81 percent of the information contained in the entire module. Thus,
unless there is an interest in discriminating between competent and very competent providers (where the
informational content of these two cases drops), these two cases are suﬃcient (with the caveat that easier
questions would help reduce errors in the lower end of the distribution). Third, by optimally weighting the
responses the competence index provides a more accurate measure of the estimated latent variable.
The distribution of competence obtained by standardizing the raw score is diﬀerent from that using item
response. In particular it is no longer bimodal, the mean score of MBBS providers is lower and the mean score
of non-MBBS providers is higher. This is consistent with thinking about the distribution of the standardized
the variance of measurement error from the IRT analysis. In a regression context where the dependant variable yi is measured
with error so that yi = y∗











MEC is the R2 corrected for measurement error and we substitute
S
σ2
ε/n when, as in our case, the measurement error
depends on the yi.T h eR2
MEC is, as expected, bounded below by R2 when there is no measurement error and bounded above
by 1, when all the residual sum of squares is governed by the measurement error.Wklfk Drfwru?: Crpelqlqj Vljqhwwhv dqg Iwhp-Rhvsrqvh wr Mhdvxuh Drfwru Qxdolw| 20
raw score as the item response distribution with normally distributed noise added on (recall that the error
from all 78 questions will be added to the "true" raw score).
Nevertheless, the use of item response does require some fairly strong identifying assumptions. In par-
ticular, the assumptions of IRT include unidimensionality of the underlying measure of competence and no
Diﬀerential Item Functioning, so that the probability of answering a question in a particular way depends
only on the underlying latent measure and not on other variables. While we have evidence that our measure
satisﬁes unidimensionality, we cannot be sure that responses to questions in the index concerning treatment
are the same for public and private providers. In some cases (the probability of providing anti-infective
drugs for viral pharyngitis) we ﬁnd diﬀerences between treatment patterns after controlling for competence
at the 10 percent level (Das and Hammer 2004).23 It is possible that doctors start thinking the way they
practice. Incentives for behavior are certainly diﬀerent between the sectors. Public doctors on salary face
very low-powered incentive schemes while private doctors face very high-powered incentives, depend on re-
taining clients and perhaps provide more services. These diﬀerences in motivation could lead to diﬀerences
in what providers think is right. In our results, private providers do recommend more proactive treatments
than public providers and this could have aﬀected our measure of competence.
23The statistical test for no DIF uses the invariance of item parameters to compare the diﬀerence between the item char-
acteristic curves for two diﬀerent groups (in our case public and private). Unfortunately, this method does not work with a
small sample. Since the test involves a chi-2 test of proportions, even splitting the sample evenly gives only 10 data points for
comparison within every group. With such small numbers, the power of the test is small and the null is generically accepted.Wklfk Drfwru?: Crpelqlqj Vljqhwwhv dqg Iwhp-Rhvsrqvh wr Mhdvxuh Drfwru Qxdolw| 21
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Frequency of Cases in Vignettes Module 
 
  Vignettes Case 













Almost Every Day  70.79  87.62  26.11  15.42  8.46 
Almost Every Week  80.20  97.52  56.65  40.30  26.87 
At Least once a month  86.14  99.01  90.15  74.13  59.20 
Once a year  88.61  99.01  97.04  94.03  85.57 
Never seen such a case  12.4  0.99  2.96  5.97  14.43 
Source: ISERDD-World Bank (2003). This table shows the frequency with which patients present with 
the illnesses covered in the vignettes. Percentages are based on reports by the providers in the sample to 
the question “How often do you see such a case in your clinic?”. 
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Mean Competence  Mean True Score 
Least Competent  -1.61  16 
Second Quintile  -0.66  19.68 
Average Competence  -0.10  23.45 
Fourth Quintile  0.73  33.17 
Most Competent  1.47  48.82 
Note: Author’s calculations based on World Bank-ISERDD (2003). Competence refers to the value of the 
latent variable estimated through item response. The true score is a monotonic non-linear transformation of 
the latent variable that shows the expected number of questions that the provider would ask in the vignettes, 
where the expectation is taken over (hypothetical) repeated administrations of the same test. 
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 Diarrhea  Viral 
Pharyngitis 
Tuberculosis Depression  Pre-Eclampsia 
Least 
Competent 
18 27 56 38 41 
Second 
Quintile 
21 37 70 44 49 
Average 
Competence 
25 45 77 48 55 
Fourth  Quintile  34 59 86 58 65 
Most 
Competent 
47 71 91 68 74 
Guessing 
Probability 
17 14 20 34 28 
Note: Author’s calculations based on World Bank-ISERDD (2003). All numbers are percentages. The 
predicted probability of non-harmful treatment is based on the item characteristic curves for the treatment 
grades. The treatment grades were assigned independently on a scale of –3 to +3 by three different raters, 
two in South Asia and one team from Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine. For this exercise the 
grades are treated as dichotomous variables. The inter-rater agreement using the kappa measure of 
agreement exceeds 80 percent for comparisons between the South-Asian doctors and the team from Johns 
Hopkins and exceeds 90 percent for the South-Asian raters. Non-harmful treatment is defined as the 
following: 
1.  Diarrhea: Not advising fluid intake, prescribing antibiotics or antidiarrheals. 
2.  Viral Pharyngitis: Advising medications other than those for symptomatic relief (such as 
analgesics) 
3.  Tuberculosis: Not referring and not prescribing multi-drug therapy. 
4.  Depression: Not referring and prescribing medications unrelated to the case. 
5.  Pre-eclampsia: Not referring the patient. 
   26















































































0.56 78 0.81 -0.32 0.54 0.39 0.61 
Note: Author’s calculations based on World Bank-ISERDD (2003). The table shows average competence in 
different neighborhoods where competence refers to the competence index derived in the text. There are seven 
neighborhoods in the study and these were assigned as low, middle and high income neighborhoods on the 
basis of  consumption aggregates from the abbreviated NSS consumption schedule administered to the 
households in the household survey. Of the seven areas in the survey, three were assigned as low-income, two 
as middle-income and two as high-income. Dividing households into three groups (poor, middle and rich) 
shows that the percentage of poor (middle) households in the low income areas are 74% (25%), 65% (25%) 
and 57% (33%); in the middle income areas 15% (73%) and 0% (46%); and in the high income areas 0% (0%) 
and 8% (21%). Hospitals were assigned to income groups depending on their location. 
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Table 5: Correlates of Competence 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 Income  and 
Institution 
Income, Institution and 
Qualification 
All variables  


























Tenure in Locality      -0.020 
(0.007)*** 














R-squared corrected for 
measurement error 
0.28 0.53  0.64 
Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The % poor 
and % middle income households in the community is computed from a consumption survey of 40 
randomly selected households through the parallel household survey. The attributes of these households are 
detailed in Das and Sánchez (2002) who shows that the households do not differ substantially from the 
random samples in Delhi of the NSS and the NFHS. For comparability, the consumption questionnaire 
administered was the abbreviated NSS consumption questionnaire. Public Doctor refers to whether the 
doctor practices in the public or the private sector. MBBS degree holder is a dummy variable indicating 
whether the provider holds an MBBS degree. The tenure in the locality is the number of years that the 
provider has practiced in that particular clinic, from data on the census of providers. The “price charged” is 
the reported price by the provider when asked about his/her fees. The origin of the provider is based on the 
census of providers and the R-squared corrected for measurement error accounts for the error of 
classification of the test. The method is detailed in the text. 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on World Bank-ISERDD (2003). The horizontal axis in the graph is 
competence, the left vertical axis is the density (in percentages) for the histogram of competence and the 
right vertical axis shows confidence intervals of competence. The solid line is estimated competence, which 
is plotted against itself (this would be the 45
o line if the scales were the same). The two dashed curves 
represent the upper and lower confidence intervals at the 95% level of confidence. The histogram 
underlying the confidence interval curves shows how competence is distributed at values of the index with 
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Figure 3: Difficulty and Discrimination of Vignettes Items 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on World Bank-ISERDD (2003). This figure shows the distribution of 
difficulty and discrimination of all the items used for estimating competence. The item numbers are 
displayed next to the scatter plot—Appendix 1, Table A details all the items used. The figure shows that 
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Figure 4: Specific Item Characteristic Curves 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on World Bank-ISERDD (2003). This figure shows the predicted and 
observed responses for specific items, plotted against competence. The dots represent expected proportions 
based on the 3 parameter logistic and triangles represent observed proportions in the data. For this exercise 
providers were grouped in 15 evenly space groups and averages were taken over provider responses in each 
group. The items correspond to the following: 
1.  Item 65: Positive responses are recorded for item 65 if the provider checks whether a woman with 
pre-eclampsia has high blood pressure. 
2.  Item 39: The provider asks a man with tuberculosis to have a chest X-ray 
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Figure 5: Unidimensionality of the Vignettes 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on World Bank-ISERDD (2003). This figure shows the 15 largest 
eigenvalues to determine whether there is a dominant first factor. The first eigenvalue is almost 5 times 
larger than the next and the 2
nd is almost indistinguishable from those following, suggesting that the 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on World Bank-ISERDD (2003). This figure shows the distribution of 
competence disaggregated by the qualification of the provider. In the first three figures, histograms are 
presented as well due to the small sample size. For qualifications, the following categories are used, where 
MBBS refers to Bachelor of Medicine and Bachelor of Surgery, the Indian equivalent of an MD in the 
United States: 
1.  Public-All MBBS: Providers in the public sector. These providers can be either in public hospitals 
or in smaller health care centers and dispensaries. All the public providers in this sample hold 
MBBS degrees, although there are a limited number of public providers who hold other degrees in 
public hospitals. 
2.  Private-MBBS: All providers in the private sector who hold a MBBS degree. 
3.  Private—Non-MBBS: All providers in the private sector who do not hold a MBBS degree. These 
could be providers who have formal training and government recognition (such as degrees in 
alternate medicine such as homeopathy or Ayurveda); providers who have no formal training, but 








































































































Distribution of Competence by Qualification  33
APPENDIX A 
 
Table A: List of Questions Used 
 
Item Number  Case  Type of Question  Question 
Item 1  Diarrhea  History  Has the child had fever? 
Item 2  Diarrhea  History  When did the child last urinate? 
Item 3  Diarrhea  History  Has the child had any vomiting? 
Item 4  Diarrhea  History  Frequency of Stools 
Item 5  Diarrhea  History  Blood/Mucous in Stool 
Item 6  Diarrhea  Examination  Pulse Rate 
Item 7  Diarrhea  Examination  Temperature 
Item 8  Diarrhea  Examination  Mucous membranes for moistness 
Item 9  Diarrhea  Examination  Tear Ducts for tears 
Item 10  Diarrhea  Examination  Skin Color and Turgor 
Item 11  Diarrhea  Examination  Palpation of Abdomen 
Item 12  Diarrhea  Examination  Depression of skull fotanaile 
Item 13  Viral Pharyngitis  History  Length of Illness 
Item 14  Viral Pharyngitis  History  History of fever? 
Item 15  Viral Pharyngitis  History  History of cough? 
Item 16  Viral Pharyngitis  History  History of chest pain? 
Item 17  Viral Pharyngitis  History  History of shortness of breath? 
Item 18  Viral Pharyngitis  History  Color of Expectorant 
Item 19  Viral Pharyngitis  History  History of headache? 
Item 20  Viral Pharyngitis  Examination  Pulse Rate 
Item 21  Viral Pharyngitis  Examination  Blood Pressure 
Item 22  Viral Pharyngitis  Examination  Temperature 
Item 23  Viral Pharyngitis  Examination  Nose and nasal passages 
Item 24  Viral Pharyngitis  Examination  Throat Inspection 
Item 25  Tuberculosis  History  History of night sweats? 
Item 26  Tuberculosis  History  History of chest pain? 
Item 27  Tuberculosis  History  History of blood in sputum? 
Item 28  Tuberculosis  History  Whether this has hapenned before? 
Item 29  Tuberculosis  History  Has this hapenned to others in the dwelling? 
Item 30  Tuberculosis  History  Patient's profession 
Item 31  Tuberculosis  Examination  Pulse Rate 
Item 32  Tuberculosis  Examination  Blood Pressure 
Item 33  Tuberculosis  Examination  Temperature 
Item 34  Tuberculosis  Examination  Chest Inspection 
Item 35  Tuberculosis  Examination  Chest Percussion 
Item 36  Tuberculosis  Examination  Auscultation   34
Item Number  Case  Type of Question  Question 
Item 37  Tuberculosis  Examination  Blood for TLC/DLC 
Item 38  Tuberculosis  Examination  Sputum for AFB 
Item 39  Tuberculosis  Examination  Chest X-ray 
Item 40  Depression  History  General mood 
Item 41  Depression  History  Does patient feel like crying? 
Item 42  Depression  History  Why does the patient feel this way? 
Item 43  Depression  History  Is there trouble sleeping? 
Item 44  Depression  History  Hours of sleep 
Item 45  Depression  History  Time of waking up 
Item 46  Depression  History  Problems in daily work 
Item 47  Depression  History  Whether any deaths/changes in the family 
Item 48  Depression  Examination  Pulse Rate 
Item 49  Depression  Examination  Blood Pressure 
Item 50  Depression  Examination  Menstrual history 
Item 51  Depression  Examination  Thyroid Glands 
Item 52  Pre-Eclampsia  History  Last Menstrual Period 
Item 53  Pre-Eclampsia  History  History of nausea or vomiting? 
Item 54  Pre-Eclampsia  History  Whether there has been swelling in the feet 
Item 55  Pre-Eclampsia  History  Whether she has felt any foetal movement 
Item 56  Pre-Eclampsia  History  Whether an ante-natal check-up was done 
Item 57  Pre-Eclampsia  History  Number of Children 
Item 58  Pre-Eclampsia  History  Type of birth 
Item 59  Pre-Eclampsia  History  Whether any other pregnancies 
Item 60  Pre-Eclampsia  History  Whether she has taken any immunizations 
Item 61  Pre-Eclampsia  History  Whether she has had an ultrasound 
Item 62  Pre-Eclampsia  History  Whether she has a history of hypertension 
Item 63  Pre-Eclampsia  History  Severity and Frequency of headaches 
Item 64  Pre-Eclampsia  Examination  Pulse Rate 
Item 65  Pre-Eclampsia  Examination   Blood PRessure 
Item 66  Pre-Eclampsia  Examination  Edema in Feet 
Item 67  Pre-Eclampsia  Examination  Examination of eyes and mouth for anemia 
Item 68  Pre-Eclampsia  Examination  Protienurea 
Item 69  Pre-Eclampsia  Examination  Urine for glucose 
Item 70  Pre-Eclampsia  Examination  Blood Glucose 
Item 71  Pre-Eclampsia  Examination  Blood Hb 
Item 72  Pre-Eclampsia  Examination  Palpatation of fetus 
Item 73  Pre-Eclampsia  Examination  Fetal Heart Rate 
Item 74  Diarrhea  Overall Treatment Score  Overall treatment score 
Item 75  Viral Pharyngitis  Overall Treatment Score  Overall treatment score 
Item 76  Tuberculosis  Overall Treatment Score  Overall treatment score   35
Item Number  Case  Type of Question  Question 
Item 77  Depression  Overall Treatment Score  Overall treatment score 
Item 78  Pre-Eclampsia  Overall Treatment Score  Overall treatment score 
 
Table B: Questions not used in analysis due to low responses 
 
Case Number   Type  Question  Percentage who 
asked 
Diarrhea Examination  Respiration  Rate  2.4 
  Examination   Blood for serum electrolytes  0.97 
 Examination  Blood  for  TLC/DLC  3.4 
Viral Pharyngitis  History  Has the patient experienced chills?  3.9 
  History  Has the patient experienced excessive 
sweating 
2.4 
  History  Is there blood in the expectorant?  3.4 
 Examination  Respiratory  Rate  4.8 
Tuberculosis  History  Riskiness of patient’s sexual behavior  0.9 
 Examination  Respiratory  Rate  0.48 
    Blood for HIV  3.9 
Depression  History  Does the patient feel scared/anxious?  4.8 
    Has the patient every thought of 
suicide? 
3.9 
    Has the patient every been 
pregnant/had an abortion? 
2.4 
    Does the patient take any 
drugs/alcohol/medication? 
1.4 
 Examination  Respiratory  Rate  0.48 
Pre-Eclampsia  History  Weight gain during pregnancy  4.4 
    Bleeding or Discharge during 
pregnancy 
1.9 
    History of diabetes?  1.4 
    History of anemia?  1.4   36
Case Number   Type  Question  Percentage who 
asked 
    History of heart disease?  0.97 
    History of any genetic disease?  0.48 
   History  of  smoking/drinking  0 
    Experiences shortness of breath?  0.97 
 Examination  Respiratory  Rate  1.9 
   Auscultation  of  Chest  4.4 
 
 